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Abstract
State-wide class-size reduction (CSR) policies have typically failed to produce large
achievement gains. One explanation is that the introduction of such policies forces
schools to hire relatively low-quality teachers. This paper uses data from an anonymous
state to explore whether teacher quality suffered from the introduction of CSR. We
find that it did, but not nearly enough to explain the small achievement effects of
CSR. The combined fall in achievement due to hiring lower quality teachers and more
inexperienced teachers is small relative to the unrealized gains. Furthermore, between-
school differences in the quality of incoming teachers cannot explain the poor estimated
CSR performance from previous quasi-experimental treatment-control comparisons.
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Elsby, Otavio Bartalotti, and Quentin Brummet, as well as seminar participants at Michigan State University
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1 Introduction
The potential for student achievement gains from smaller classes has been well documented
in experimental and quasi-experimental research over the last two decades (Krueger 1999;
Krueger & Whitmore 2001; Angrist & Lavy 1999). As of 2005, this potential led to the
adoption of class-size reduction (CSR) measures in thirty-two states (Council for Education
Policy, Research and Improvement (CEPRI) 2005). To date, studies of CSR policies find
only mixed evidence of achievement effects, with estimates consistently falling short of what
might be expected from the experimental research. Due to the high costs of implementation,
$21 billion over nine years in Florida (Florida Department of Education) and of $1.5 billion a
year in California (Bohrnstedt & Stecher 1999), the efficacy of CSR policies has been called
into question. One common explanation for the under performance of CSR is that it forces
schools to hire new teachers of lower quality in order to meet the class-size requirements.
The gains from having smaller classes are thought to be offset by having teachers of lower
quality in the classroom.
Previous studies of this hypothesis have focused on evidence from California’s CSR pro-
gram (Kane & Staiger 2005, Jepsen & Rivkin 2009). However, studies of California CSR
are limited by the available data. Chief among these limitations is a lack of linked student-
teacher test score data until several years after CSR’s introduction (Kane & Staiger 2005).
Due to differential teacher attrition and human capital accumulation, this leaves the short-
run implications of CSR induced hiring unanswered. Furthermore, the linked data that is
available covers only a single district, prohibiting an analysis of heterogeneity across districts
or the potential for across-district hiring spillovers. While school aggregated data is avail-
able for the period around California’s introduction of CSR, this data still does not include
any pre-policy test score measures. Identification using the school average data also relies
on observed teacher characteristics in order to estimate changes in teacher quality (Jepsen
& Rivkin 2009). However, much of the education production function literature finds that
these characteristics play only a small role in explaining the variation in student achievement
(Goldhaber 2008)
Using administrative data on individual students and teachers in grades four through six
from an anonymous state (subsequently referred to as State X)1 covering the introduction
of a state-wide CSR program, this paper explores the teacher quality hypothesis in detail,
while overcoming the limitations of the prior work. As a starting point, we consider whether
there is any evidence that the CSR-induced demand increase did in fact lead to schools hiring
1The State X Department of Education has requested the state be kept anonymous for all publications
and presentations as a condition of data access and use.
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and retaining lower quality teachers, here measured by value-added to student mathematics
achievement.2 In doing so, we exploit this sudden increase in teacher demand to inform the
literature on an understudied, yet important, feature of teacher labor markets, the value-
added elasticity of teacher supply. Finally, we consider the implications of our findings for
interpreting prior quasi-experimental estimates of CSR achievement performance in terms
of the teacher quality hypothesis.
The value-added estimates of cohort performance found here indicate a modest reduction
in the average quality of both newly hired teachers and teachers who are retained after their
first year. In terms of student achievement, the estimated conditional mean performance of
the larger post-CSR hiring cohorts ranges from 0.0033 to 0.0277 test score standard devia-
tions lower than the smaller pre-CSR cohorts in each cohort’s first year. These differences
in cohort performance persist partially over time as the composition of each cohort changes,
with the differences in pre- and post-CSR second year cohort effects ranging from 0.0078 to
0.0192 standard deviations. However, there is evidence that further attrition for post-CSR
hiring cohorts may lead to negligible differences among the remaining teachers after three
to four years, implying an even smaller long-run CSR hiring effect on achievement. It is
important to note that these results are robust to several estimation approaches.
Even if the average quality of cohorts had not changed, there may have been an additional
short-run effect of CSR hiring on student performance due to hiring more teachers with less
experience. The fall in average achievement attributable to the change in both average
quality and experience is less than one-fiftieth of the test score standard deviation. This
fall in achievement is driven primarily by changes in cohort quality, rather than experience.
Importantly for the teacher quality hypothesis, this drop in quality was generally faced by all
schools. In fact, schools classified as treated (those for which CSR was binding) in previous
quasi-experimental estimates of CSR policy effects in State X experience a slightly smaller
drop in achievement attributable to the stock of teachers than those considered untreated.
This difference is of the opposite sign needed to support the teacher quality hypothesis.
Further, it suggests a role for competition for teacher candidates pushing all schools along
the effective teacher supply curve in connected labor markets.
The results are informative beyond providing a better understanding of CSR programs.
The results help fill a gap in the prior literature on the quality elasticity of teacher supply.
2Similar results obtained using reading test scores are available upon request from the author. Generally,
the reading results are slightly smaller in magnitude and were slightly more sensitive to the specification
and estimator chosen. However, these differences do not change the conclusions drawn. The decision to
focus on mathematics scores only was made for the sake of brevity and due to the fact that it is common
in the education production function literature for mathematics scores to be more responsive to inputs than
reading.
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Namely, the intervention studied here provides a rare opportunity to observe a substantial
increase in the number of teachers hired for the same schools in a short time period. This sort
of variation is preferred to relying on cross-sectional or longer run differences in teacher hiring
to identify this elasticity. An understanding of the nature of the underlying teacher labor
supply is useful for predicting the impact of any intervention that results in a sudden change
in teacher demand. For instance, short-run increases in teacher demand associated with
retirement buyout plans or changes in curriculum are often met with concerns over the quality
of the new teachers hired (Center for Local State and Urban Policy 2010). Additionally,
recent papers have simulated the achievement effects of value-added based retention policies,
the results of which depend critically on the assumptions regarding the quality elasticity of
teacher supply (Goldhaber & Theobald 2011, Boyd et al. 2011). The results found here are
informative in predicting the fall in quality associated with such policies.
The paper proceeds as follows: section 2 provides a review of the relevant literature and
background information, section 3 discusses the institutional details of the policy, section
4 discusses the data used, section 5 looks at the market for teachers in State X around
CSR implementation, section 6 discusses the empirical strategy used throughout, section 7
confirms prior CSR effect estimates for State X, section 8 gives and discusses the baseline
results and checks the sensitivity of these results, section 9 gives the preferred estimates
that account for teacher attrition, section 10 considers the implications of our findings for
interpreting prior quasi-experimental CSR effect estimates, and section 11 concludes.
2 Literature Review and Background
Based on the random assignment of students and teachers to classrooms of varying sizes, the
results of the Tennessee STAR experiment suggested that class-size reduction is a potentially
viable tool to promote achievement gains. Krueger (1999) analyzes STAR and finds that
being randomly assigned to a small (13-17 students) class as opposed to a larger class (22-25
students) in early elementary school led to roughly one-fifth of a standard deviation increase
in average test scores. In a follow-up, Krueger & Whitmore (2001) find that being in a
small class also impacted student outcomes well after the experiment, such as increasing
the likelihood of taking a college entrance exam. More recent work by Chetty et al. (2011)
suggests that the benefits of being assigned to a small class in STAR even persist into the
adult labor market
The positive achievement effects from Tennessee STAR led many states to explore the
use of CSR to promote student achievement growth. By 2005, thirty-two states had adopted
some sort of CSR program (CEPRI 2005). Despite CSR’s popularity among teachers and
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parents, there is only mixed support for the conclusion that these large-scale programs
are effective at helping to raise test scores. In their official report on CSR in California,
Bohrnstedt & Stecher (2002) were unable to find conclusive evidence of achievement gains for
kindergarten through third grade. In contrast, Jepsen & Rivkin (2009) use class-size variation
from California CSR and find that a ten student reduction in class size is associated with
an increase in achievement of one-tenth to one-twentieth of a standard deviation in grades
two through four. Like Bohrnstedt & Stecher, Chingos (2012) found null effects for fourth
through eighth grade of CSR in Florida. We will discuss policy effect estimates from State X
in more detail in section 7, however a prior paper has similarly found no evidence of positive
achievement effects from the policy.
Assuming that there are potential gains from reducing class size, a leading explanation
for the failure of CSR revolves around changes in teacher quality associated with the imple-
mentation of the program (Stecher & Bohrnstedt 2000; Imazeki n. d.; Buckingham 2003;
CEPRI 2005, Chingos 2012).3 In interpreting his results, Chingos suggests that factors “such
as reduced teacher quality” may help explain his findings. One way in which teacher quality
may change is if schools are forced to hire additional teachers from lower on the quality dis-
tribution in order to meet the new class-size requirements. Schools may also retain teachers
that would otherwise have been dismissed for poor performance to lessen the hiring bur-
den. Gains associated with smaller classes are then offset by having less capable teachers in
classrooms, yielding no gains on net.
To support these teacher-quality-based explanations, Stecher & Bohrnstedt (2000) docu-
ment declines in the percentages of fully certified teachers, teachers with advanced degrees,
and experienced teachers in California. While changes in teacher characteristics do indicate
changes in the teacher workforce, the link between these characteristics and achievement has
often been found to be weak. Goldhaber (2008) provides a detailed review of the education
production function literature concluding that teacher quality is not “strongly correlated”
with observable teacher characteristics. Therefore, the finding that observable teacher char-
acteristics change after CSR implementation may not adequately explain the lack of test
score gains. The more relevant question is whether schools are forced to hire teachers who
contribute less to a student’s achievement growth.
Jepsen & Rivkin (2009) analyze California’s CSR program to estimate the relationship
3Note that not all experimental and quasi-experimental studies find significant class-size effects (Hoxby
2000). A recent paper by Rockoff (2009) discusses the results of several class-size experiments from the
beginning of the twentieth century and concludes that the balance of these early class-size experiments
suggest there was little achievement benefit to attending smaller classes. This conclusion comes with several
caveats. Most importantly, it seems plausible that changes in the educational environment since the early
twentieth century may have changed the role of class size in affecting achievement.
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between teacher cohort size and quality. The authors use data aggregated at the school
level, meaning they cannot identify the teachers that make up a hiring cohort or link stu-
dents to specific teachers. Instead, Jepsen & Rivkin examine whether the estimated effects of
school-average teacher experience and certification status differed across years. Intuitively,
this approach identifies the quality of new cohorts of teachers because those teachers cate-
gorized as inexperienced or uncertified in a given year are more likely to be the new hires.
They find no statistically or practically significant differences in the estimated experience or
certification effects across years. The finding that much of the variation in teacher quality
does not work through observed characteristics makes interpreting these results difficult.
Kane & Staiger (2005) are able to partially address the identification issue discussed
above by using individual-level data from Los Angeles to analyze the hiring achievement
effect of California’s CSR program. They calculate value-added for teachers hired for the
1995-96 school year, just before CSR was introduced, and compare it to value-added for the
first CSR cohort hired in 1996-97. They find no differences among the two cohorts of teachers
in terms of value-added. However, due to data availability, this comparison can only be made
starting with the 1999-2000 school year, four to five years after the teachers were initially
hired. Given differential attrition by teachers of varying quality and human capital growth
for those teachers that remained, this comparison may miss important short-run effects on
student achievement. The analysis may also miss differences between Los Angeles and other
districts in the state, making it difficult to conclude how general the results are. Finally,
using data from a single district may miss potential hiring spillovers that are important
for understanding the unrealized gains from CSR. With data on individual students and
teachers for an entire state that spans the introduction of the policy, it is possible to assess
the change in teacher quality associated with CSR more directly and overcome many of the
limitations of the prior work.
3 Institutional Details: CSR in State X
In November of 2002, State X voters approved a constitutional amendment that created
a new state wide CSR program. The program was set to begin in the 2003-2004 school
year. Separate class-size maximums were set for different grade levels, as shown in Table
1. The law established per-pupil allocations from the state government for each year a
district or school was found to be in compliance. There is anecdotal evidence from board of
education meeting transcripts that the allocation was not enough to cover the full costs of
CSR implementation for some districts. This anecdote suggests that a reallocation of other
resources may partially explain CSR performance. This possibility will be explored in the
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Table 1: CSR in State X
Grades Maximum Percent Below Max Yr 1 Average CS Yr 1 Average CS Yr 8
KG-G3 18 12% 23 16
G4-G8 22 42% 24 19
G9-G12 25 91% 24 22
Source: State X Department of Education
results section.
The new law allowed for a gradual phase-in of the mandated class sizes. A district or
school was in compliance if it had lowered the average class size by two students from the
previous year or if it was already below the maximum. For the first three years of the
program, the compliance was based on the district average, while the next three years it was
based on a school-level average. Non-compliance by districts or schools initially resulted in a
portion of the CSR allocation being directed toward capital outlays aimed at reducing class
size. Beginning in the third year of the program, the threatened sanctions for non-compliance
became more severe. According to the law, districts not in compliance were to be forced
to implement one of the following four policies: having year-round schools, having double
sessions in schools, changing school attendance zones, or altering the use of instructional
staff.
As seen in Table 1, the new maximums were binding for most districts at implementation
with only 12% and 42% of districts below the required average class size in kindergarten
through third grade and fourth grade through eighth grade, respectively. With average class
size dropping from 23 to 16 for the earliest grades and from 24 to 19 in the middle grades,
it is clear that the program did achieve the stated goal of reducing class size.
4 Data
The data used for this analysis will be a combination of restricted-use state administrative
data and State X’s published class-size averages. The extract of the administrative data
available for this study links students in grades one through six to teachers and schools from
the 2000-2001 to the 2007-2008 school year. Importantly, the students are linked directly to
their math teacher. In other prominent administrative data sets, the student/teacher match
is less clean with students linked to all teachers at the grade level or to end-of-year exam
proctors. In addition to basic student demographics, the data include mathematics scores
for State X’s criterion-referenced high-stakes test for students from third to sixth grade.
These test score data enable the estimation of teacher value-added for teachers in grades
four through six over a seven-year period starting with the 2001-2002 school year.
The data track teachers over the same time period as the students. This allows teachers
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to be followed as long as they stay in the state’s elementary school education system. For
instance, it is possible to identify when teachers enter or exit the public elementary school
system over time. The teacher information includes relevant variables such as a teacher’s
experience and degree level. The experience measure used is the sum of four separate cate-
gories that are recorded for each teacher capturing all prior experience in public and private
schools both within State X and in other states. This encompassing experience measure
will be important when distinguishing between teacher quality and experience effects due to
the CSR-induced hiring by allowing re-entrants to be considered separately from truly new
teachers.
Finally, State X has made each district/school’s average class size within the three en-
forcement grade groupings publicly available since the beginning of the CSR program. These
class-size averages allow for the identification of districts and schools that needed to reduce
class size in order to stay compliant. Descriptive statistics for the key variables used in this
study are presented in Appendix Table 1. Notably, nearly 70% of the student-year obser-
vations in the data are linked to a teacher observed entering at some point in the sample
period allowing for comparisons across cohorts.
5 Market for Teachers in State X During CSR
Before analyzing the achievement outcomes associated with CSR and the subsequent teacher
hiring in State X, it is important to consider the general state of the teacher labor market, as
well as any factors that may have led to changes in the supply or demand for teachers over
the same time period. Such an analysis is important for interpreting the results that follow
and helps to tie the current work to the previous CSR literature on changes in the teacher
workforce. We begin with a discussion of trends in teacher numbers and characteristics over
the introduction of CSR.
Figure 1 displays the trends in both the stock and flow over time in the number of
teachers, percent with an advanced degree, average experience, and percent with three or
fewer years of experience. Here, the focus is on teachers teaching a core course (those that fall
under CSR requirements) in grades four through six (those for which value-added estimation
is possible with our data). Recall that the data follow all first through sixth grade teachers
in public schools in State X. Therefore, a teacher will be considered part of the flow into
teaching if they are new to teaching, returning to teaching, transferring from a public middle
or high school, moving from a private school within the state, or moving from a public or
private school in another state.
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Figure 1: Teacher Stock and Flow Trends
 Stock  Flow
In panel A, we see a steady rise in teacher numbers over the introduction of CSR from
under 19,500 before CSR to nearly 24,500 after five years. This rise is accompanied by an
increase in the number of teachers entering the data each year of roughly 2,000 by the fourth
year of CSR.4 We also see that the percentage with an advanced degree among both the stock
and inflow falls with the introduction of CSR and the change to school-level enforcement,
while increasing in the other years. Average experience of all teachers drops from a pre-
CSR level of roughly eleven years to nearly 9.5 years by the introduction of school-level
enforcement four years later. Not surprisingly, the percentage of teachers considered novices,
with three or fewer years of experience also increased over the implementation of CSR. For
a more detailed discussion of changes in the observable characteristics of teachers in State
X over CSR implementation, see Dieterle (2012).
While this descriptive analysis has established a clear link between the timing of the CSR
policy and both an increase in hiring and a drop in average experience of teachers, there are
other concurrent factors worth mentioning. In terms of the demand for teachers, State X
was facing a growing student population that, irrespective of CSR, would require additional
teachers. Soon after CSR adoption, the state projected the hiring needs across all grades and
4Note the scale break in Panel A.
9
Table 2: Projected Hiring in State X
Year
Hiring Need 2004-05 2005-06 2006-07 2007-08
CSR 4,324 2,378 11,821 974
Enrolment Growth 3,297 3,024 3,134 3,451
subjects from CSR and student enrolment growth, as shown in Table 2. Hiring needs driven
by enrolment growth were projected to be fairly steady, at just over 3,000 each year. At
the change to school-level enforcement in 2006-07, the number of new teachers needed due
to CSR was projected to be nearly three times that from enrolment growth. The projected
difference for the grades studied here are likely to be even more stark, as the numbers in
Table 2 include high school grades that were relatively unaffected by CSR. For the years
and grades studied here, the student population never saw growth rates above 1.55% and
in 2003-04 at the introduction of CSR, actually saw a decrease from the prior year. While
the underlying growth of the student population certainly implies that the stock of teachers
was likely to grow regardless of CSR, due to the relatively flat profile for enrolment growth
based hiring it is also likely that the sudden increase in the number of teachers hired shown
in Figure 1 was in fact largely due to CSR.5 In the analysis that follows, it is best to think of
the results coming from a situation where CSR has been implemented in a state of growing
enrolment and that CSR policies implemented in times of falling or roughly stable student
numbers may lead to different results. However, it is important to note that rising student
numbers is the reality in many cases and, as such, is not unique to State X.
Over this time period, the state commonly recruited teachers from other states to fill
teaching needs. If out-of-state teachers are less familiar with the curriculum and the marginal
teachers hired due to CSR were from out-of-state, any fall in teacher quality may partially
reflect this. Once more, this does not invalidate the results to follow, as such a strategy
may be pursued by any state facing an increase in teacher demand. Simply put, hiring
more out-of-state teachers is one of the margins schools can move along when faced with
CSR. Nevertheless, the administrative data can be used to help assess the importance of
this hypothesis for interpreting the results. While the data do not include indicators for
where a teacher completed their initial educator training, separate experience measures are
recorded for time spent in State X and in other states. Recall from Panel C of Figure 1 that
many entering teachers in our data have some previous experience, therefore we can look at
entrants separately by the type of experience.
5Note that the trend in actual hiring may have been smoother than the projected numbers due to pre-
emptive hiring.
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Figure 2: Entering Teachers by Prior Experience Type
Figure 2 plots the proportion of all entering teachers in the fourth through sixth grade core
course sample that have no prior experience, experience in State X, and experience outside
of State X. Note that some teachers identified as entering the data will have both in- and
out-of-state experience. We see that the proportion of new entrants that have prior out-
of-state experience stays roughly level at about 15%. We do see a rise in the proportion
with no prior experience and a fall in those with prior experience in the state. The result
is an eroding of a pre-policy gap of nearly 15 percentage points in favor of hiring a larger
proportion of teachers with prior in-state experience. This gap begins to reappear after the
2005-06 school year.
This analysis cannot capture changes in the composition of newly hired teachers without
prior experience. While complete records covering this period are not available, one report
from the state suggests that of the newly certified teachers whose certification was based on
completion of an approved preparation program, roughly a quarter were from an out of state
program in the first year of CSR, 2003-04, and another report puts the number at 29% the
following year. As the majority of new hires entered with either prior experience in State X
or were trained in State X, an increase in hiring out-of-state teachers can play only a small
role in interpreting the main results of this paper.
While other changes in demand serve to inform the interpretation of the main analysis of
this paper, it is concurrent changes in teacher supply that pose the biggest threat to validity.
In particular, over the time period studied, State X introduced measures to reduce the costs
of entering the teaching profession through alternative certification pathways. These changes
included the authorization of school districts (rather than just colleges and universities) to
provide professional preparation programs for certification beginning in the 2002-2003 school
year and a law in 2004 allowing for the creation of teacher preparation institutes for college
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graduates with a non-education degree to receive certification (Feistritzer 2007). If these
measures led to a change in the labor supply of teachers in CSR years, part of what is
estimated as changes in cohort quality in this paper may be capturing these changes as
well. Fortunately, the uptake of these alternative pathways was quite low over the period of
our data. Sass (2011) documents the number of teachers in grades three through ten from
2000-2001 to 2006-2007 certified by these two pathways at only 1,679. Clearly, the number
of these alternatively certified teachers in grades four through six will be much lower and, in
the longer run, some substitution from traditional certification may be expected, suggesting
little role for the introduction of these two programs to be driving the results that follow.
6 Empirical Methodology
The methodology used here follows from the standard value-added approach to education
production function estimation. For the purposes of this paper, teacher quality will be defined
as the contribution teachers make to student mathematics achievement growth. While it is
clear that test scores are only one facet of a student’s academic growth and that a good
teacher may contribute to other areas such as a child’s social development, the advent of
school accountability programs has positioned test scores as the key measure used to assess
teachers and schools. Indeed, value-added to test scores is a particularly appropriate metric
for assessing why test scores did not increase more with CSR.
Here, we outline the basic strategy for identifying changes in teacher quality. These
baseline estimates are presented in section 8 along with several sensitivity checks and then our
preferred estimates that account for teacher attrition are presented in section 9. The baseline
specification discussed first provides for a more tractable comparison among the several
estimators considered. The intuition presented here for interpreting the results broadly
applies to the other estimates as well. The main strategies used here are based on OLS
estimation of what will be referred to as a lag score specification due to the presence of the
student’s prior test score as an explanatory variable:6
Aigst =ζt + λAigst−1 +Xigstβ + Cohortigstγ1 + γ2A−igst−1 + f(Expigst) (6.1)
+ γ3CSigst + φg + ci + δs + eigst
where
i, g, s, t index student, grade, school, and year
6See Appendix B: Measuring Teacher Quality for a discussion of value-added estimation.
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Aigst is student i’s test score
ζt are year fixed effects
Aigst−1 is student i’s prior test score
Xigst are student demographics
7
Cohortigst are teacher cohort indicators
A−igst−1 is the average prior test score of student i’s classmates
f(Expigst) is a cubic in teacher experience
CSigst is a proxy measure of class size
8
φg are grade fixed effects
ci is an unobserved student heterogeneity term
δs are school fixed effects
Note that the OLS estimation of (6.1) (our preferred strategy) treats ci as if it were equal
to zero for all students. While this assumption may not hold in practice, there is evidence
that OLS estimation of the lag score specification typically performs well. Using simulated
data, Guarino et al. (2011) find that the lag score specification estimated by OLS is fairly
robust, compared to other common value-added estimators, to different teacher and student
sorting mechanisms. Kane & Staiger (2008) find that this method does the best at estimating
a teacher’s value-added in non-experimental settings by comparing estimates for the same
teachers both with and without random assignment to students. The intuition for this result
is that assignment is driven more by dynamic (i.e. changes in test performance), rather
than static, characteristics of students. Estimators that attempt to eliminate unobserved
student heterogeneity introduce additional assumptions and greatly reduce the identifying
variation, while failing to capture much of the assignment mechanism that threatens the
validity of the estimates. Broadly, the presence of ci only threatens the consistency of our
results if student-teacher assignment decisions are made in such a way to induce a correlation
between the time-constant student heterogeneity and the hiring year of a student’s teacher.
In exploring the sensitivity of the results in section 8, we will argue that such assignment
policies are unlikely in practice.
The main coefficients of interest are the estimates of γ1, the average quality of entry
7The student controls include indicators for race, gender, disability status, free or reduced price lunch
status, limited English proficiency, being foreign born, as well as the student’s age and the number of days
present and absent while attending a particular school.
8Class size is measured by the number of students linked to a teacher in a given year in the test data.
While this serves as a reasonable proxy in fourth and fifth grade, it is less reliable in sixth grade when many
schools have teachers teaching multiple classes. In estimating (6.1) we allow for different effects of class size
for each grade. The proxy measure of class size is important for separating out the quality of newly hired
teachers from any effect the reduced class sizes may have had on achievement under CSR.
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cohorts of teachers. Specifically, interest lies in comparing the average quality of cohorts
hired before and after the introduction of CSR. The teacher-quality explanation for the poor
performance of CSR would be consistent with smaller gains associated with cohorts entering
the data after CSR was implemented compared to earlier cohorts.
The inclusion of δs, the school fixed effects, is important for two reasons. First, it helps
to control for differences across schools in student ability. The school fixed effects are also
critical to identify whether schools hired teachers of lower quality in CSR years. Given
evidence that there is substantial sorting of teachers into geographically small markets (Boyd
et al. 2005; Lankford et al. 2002), each school may face a different level of average teacher
quality. For now, assume there was no change in the quality of teachers hired by particular
schools, but that CSR disproportionately induced hiring in schools that faced supplies of
lower quality teachers. In this scenario, without controlling for these school level differences
we would identify a negative relationship between CSR years and the average quality of new
entrants. The inclusion of school fixed effects controls for the time-invariant quality level of
teacher supply that different schools face by relying on within school comparisons of teachers.
In section 8 we will consider an alternative approach that relies on within school-grade-year
variation.
The experience profile can be thought to capture three distinct factors: teaching-specific
human capital accumulation, non-random sorting of students to teachers based on experience,
and non-random attrition of teachers. Focusing on the human capital piece of the experience
profile, the possible effect of CSR on short-run achievement is better captured when the
experience of the teacher is not controlled for. However, controlling for experience allows for a
more direct comparison of teacher quality throughout the sample period. If experience is not
controlled for, teachers from earlier cohorts may look better than later cohorts simply because
the estimates are partially based on years in which these teachers have more experience
than later cohorts. The joint contribution of both cohort quality and experience to student
achievement is considered in more detail later.
Care should be taken in interpreting the estimates of equation (6.1), as State X enacted
many policies over the introduction of CSR. Note, however, that changes in state policy
that affect all students and teachers in a particular year, such as changes in curriculum, will
be controlled for by the inclusion of the year fixed effects, ζt. Here the main concerns are
policy changes that alter the quality of teachers hired in a particular year and are therefore
captured in the estimates of γ1. As mentioned in the previous section, the expansion of
alternative certification pathways represents the most salient threat to the results. However,
given the relatively low take up rate of these new options, it is unlikely that the estimates
of cohort quality are being driven by this policy.
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The approach adopted here captures potential CSR effects that would be difficult to
identify given the available data. For example, the school-level class-size averages within the
enforcement grade groupings are only available starting with the year directly before school-
level enforcement.9 This data limitation makes it difficult to identify individual schools
that may have hired additional teachers during district-level enforcement years in order
to preempt the switch to school-level enforcement. The estimates of γ1 for the 2005-2006
hiring cohort will include the effect of schools hiring additional teachers because of the
switch in enforcement the following year. Note that these teacher value-added measures
may also capture changes over time in resources that complement a teacher’s ability to
raise achievement. If CSR led to a reduction in these resources, then part of the change in
measured teacher effectiveness over time may be capturing these changes as well. There is
some suggestive evidence, discussed later, that this is not a large problem in interpreting
the results. Finally, while the estimation strategies employed here are more susceptible to
omitted variables bias than comparable quasi-experimental designs, other approaches that
estimate Local Average Treatment Effects or rely on defining treatment groups will tend to
be ill-suited for identifying the sort of general equilibrium effects that underpin the teacher
quality hypothesis studied here. We will specifically consider the possibility of treatment
spillovers in section 10.
7 Confirming Prior CSR Achievement Effect Estimates
Before presenting the baseline results, we estimate the CSR policy effect within the frame-
work discussed in section 6. These results will complement a prior paper on CSR effects in
State X to confirm that it fell short of the potential experimental gains from reducing class
size for the sample and model used here. Specifically, equation (6.1) is adapted by replacing
the cohort indicators, teacher experience, and class size variables with CSR treatment-by-
year indicators:
Aigst =ζt + λAigst−1 +Xigstβ + (T × Y earst)γ1 + γ2A−igst−1 + φg (7.1)
+ ci + δs + eigst
Two separate regressions are estimated based on school- or district- level CSR enforce-
9While the state does have records of average class size at the school level for several years prior to CSR,
these are not separated by the enforcement grades. Since many of the schools studied here include grades
in both the K-3 and 4-8 enforcement groupings, it is difficult to create a comparable measure of average
class-size that is directly related to CSR enforcement. Furthermore, these other class-size records are based
on student counts in October, while the CSR enforcement averages are based on counts made in February.
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ment. For the district-level enforcement, treatment T equals 1 for districts that were above
the new class-size maximum in the year before CSR, and 0 otherwise. The school-level
treatment status is similarly determined by the school average class size the year prior to
school-level enforcement. It is important to note that the regressions include year and school
dummy variables and the omitted treatment category is for the 2001-2002 cohort.
Table 3: Estimated CSR Mathematics
Achievement Effects for State X
CSR Level District School
Tx2002-2003 -0.0170 -0.0323
(0.0180) (0.0244)
Tx2003-2004 0.0163 -0.0284*
(0.0152) (0.0143)
Tx2004-200 5 0.0264** -0.00604
(0.0125) (0.0102)
Tx2005-2006 0.00902 -0.0459***
(0.0183) (0.0164)
Tx2006-2007 -0.00522 -0.0410*
(0.0186) (0.0231)
Tx2007-2008 0.00915 -0.0273
(0.0156) (0.0216)
Observations 2,752,060 2,716,399
R-squared 0.653 0.653
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses;
District (school) level for district (school) CSR
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 3 presents the estimates of (7.1) for district- and school-level CSR with district-
enforcement years shaded light gray and school-enforcement years in dark gray. Note that
these regressions use test scores standardized within grade and year as the dependent vari-
able. Beginning with the district-CSR results, most of the estimated CSR achievement
effects are small and not statistically different from either zero or the estimated pre-CSR
treatment-year interaction coefficient (T x 2002-2003 ). The one exception is the 2004-2005
effect, estimated to be a statistically significant 0.0264 standard deviations. While statisti-
cally significant, the point estimate is practically small. As a rough point of comparison, a
simple prediction of the potential effect of CSR based on the STAR estimates of Krueger
(1999) would be on the order of one-eighth of a standard deviation.10 Even the ninety-five
10Krueger estimates the small class effect in third grade (the closest grade to those considered here) to
be roughly one-fifth of a standard deviation. This corresponds to an average difference in class-size of eight
students, from 24 to 16. State X’s average class-size change in fourth through eighth grade was five students,
from 24 to 19. Assuming a linear effect of class-size, the Krueger estimates from Tennessee suggest an effect
16
percent confidence intervals for these estimates fall short of half of the rough Tennessee
STAR benchmark.
As shown by the results in the last column of Table 3, the treatment-by-year effects after
the switch to school-level enforcement during the 2006-2007 school year are negative. The
interpretation of these results is made more difficult by the fact that there are also statistically
significant negative CSR achievement effects estimated prior to the switch to school-level
enforcement. One potential explanation is that those schools farthest from meeting the class-
size requirements in 2006-2007 were forced to allocate more resources to class-size reduction
in anticipation of the switch in enforcement.
The results found in Table 3 generally concur with those found in State X in prior paper
using similar data and treatment definitions, but employing a Comparative Interrupted Time
Series estimation approach. Both suggest, at most, small positive effects of CSR when treat-
ment is defined by pre-CSR district level class-size averages and potentially negative effects
for estimates based on school-level treatment status. A full investigation of the potential
issues in estimating CSR effects in State X is beyond the scope of this paper. It is reassuring
that the approach adopted here yields roughly similar results to the previous paper on CSR
achievement effects in State X. Importantly the evidence here and in the prior paper allow
for the possibility that the average quality of the newly hired teachers may have affected the
performance of the policy compared to the experimental results.
8 Baseline Estimates and Sensitivity
Table 4 presents the baseline estimates of the cohort effects (γ1) from equation (6.1) in the
first column.11 Of particular interest are the estimated coefficients on the teacher entry cohort
dummy variables. These estimates reflect the conditional mean performance of students in
classrooms taught by teachers entering the data in each year, relative to those students in
classrooms taught by teachers already in the State X public elementary school system at the
beginning of the panel. The policy-relevant comparison is between pre-CSR and post-CSR
cohorts. Again we use the convention of shading district CSR enforcement years in light gray
and school CSR enforcement years in dark gray. For reference, the initial cohort size is also
presented. All specifications are estimated using developmental scale test scores that have
of one-fortieth of a standard deviation per student which gives the simple prediction of one-eighth. This
Tennessee STAR Benchmark can be thought of as a rough guide for assessing CSR and cohort performance.
While it is not clear what magnitude of achievement effects would constitute a successful CSR policy, having
an external, experimental comparison is preferred to simply testing for statistically significant estimates.
11See Appendix Table 2 for other estimates from these regressions.
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been standardized within grade and year.12 The results show that students with teachers
who entered during CSR perform worse on average. For instance, students of teachers from
the 2006-2007 cohort are estimated to score, on average, over one-fiftieth of a standard
deviation (0.0319-0.00929=0.0226; p-value=0.000)13 worse than students with a 2002-2003
cohort teacher.
Overall, the estimated post-CSR cohort effects range from 0.0069 (p-value=0.150) to
0.0285 (p-value=0.000)standard deviations lower than the two pre-CSR cohorts.14 The mag-
nitude of the differences seen in column (1) of Table 4 are small relative to the unrealized
CSR achievement gains in State X. Recall that a simple extrapolation of the STAR results
would place the expected achievement gain at roughly one-eighth of a standard deviation.
By comparison, we estimate a fall in average student performance of, at most, one-thirty-
fifth of a standard deviation only in the classes taught by newly hired teachers. That is not
to say that the achievement effects for the students in these classrooms was trivial. Rather,
when we consider the contribution changes in teacher quality may play in understanding the
CSR achievement effect estimates (Section 10), it is unlikely that cohort differences of the
size seen here will generate large changes in CSR performance.
In addition to the baseline estimates, we consider two main sensitivity checks. The
first is to address the unobserved student heterogeneity term (ci) found in equation (6.1).
Recall that our baseline estimator ignores the presence of ci, which, loosely speaking, will
lead to inconsistent cohort effect estimates if the hiring cohort of a student’s teacher is
correlated with ci. We consider two ways to control for ci. First, we use the fixed effects
(FE) estimator that can be obtained by OLS on the within-student time-demeaned data.
Importantly, the FE estimator is inconsistent when lagged dependent variables are included
as explanatory variables. Instead we control for prior achievement by using the test score
gain as the dependent variable (fixing λ = 1 in (6.1)).15 Moving forward, it is helpful to
distinguish between the fixed effects estimator used to control for unobserved heterogeneity
at the individual level, and the inclusion of group level (grade, year, or school) fixed effects.
Columns (2) and (3) of Table 4 display cohort effects estimated by FE both excluding and
including the school fixed effects, respectively.16 Finally, we also consider a 2SLS version
12There is no agreement on the preferred choice between scale scores and grade-year standardized scale
scores. Here, the main conclusions that can be drawn do not differ with this choice. See Reardon & Galindo
(2009) for a brief discussion of the two approaches.
13Throughout we will present p-values for tests that two particular cohort values are the same.
14All pre- post-CSR cohort comparisons are statistically significant at the 5% level except the comparison
between the 2002-2003 cohort and the 2003-2004 cohort
15Note that the choice of the gain score or lag score estimating equation is of little consequence here, with
OLS estimates producing nearly identical cohort effect estimates.
16Controlling for student and school fixed effects simultaneously relies on the presence of sufficient school-
switching among students, as such, we consider estimates both with and without the school effects.
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Table 4: Baseline Cohort Effect Estimates and Sensitivity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Prior Score Lag Gain Gain Lag Lag
Estimator OLS FE FE FDIV OLS
Entry Cohort
2001-2002 -0.0035 0.0028 -0.0011 0.0019 -0.0035
N=2824 (0.0033) (0.0079) (0.0076) (0.0039) (0.0025)
2002-2003 -0.0093*** -0.0142** -0.0107 -0.0154*** -0.0102***
N=2856 (0.0025) (0.0065) (0.0071) (0.0035) (0.0030)
2003-2004 -0.0162*** -0.0273*** -0.0215** -0.0248*** -0.0148***
N=3378 (0.0047) (0.0050) (0.0083) (0.0026) (0.0047)
2004-2005 -0.0221*** -0.0365*** -0.0327*** -0.0305*** -0.0198***
N=4037 (0.0046) (0.0098) (0.0089) (0.0050) (0.0046)
2005-2006 -0.0304*** -0.0442*** -0.0439*** -0.0387*** -0.0254***
N=4247 (0.0024) (0.0066) (0.0063) (0.0042) (0.0023)
2006-2007 -0.0319*** -0.0434*** -0.0414*** -0.0395*** -0.0293***
N=4492 (0.0045) (0.0100) (0.0083) (0.0052) (0.0034)
2007-2008 -0.0265*** -0.0166* -0.0154** -0.0245*** -0.0241***
N=3390 (0.0047) (0.0092) (0.0075) (0.0049) (0.0038)
Fixed Effects
Student No Yes Yes Yes No
School Yes No Yes No No
Grade Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes No
School-Grade-Year No No No No Yes
Observations 2,752,060 2,752,060 2,752,060 1,329,658 2,752,060
R-Squared 0.653 0.399 0.412 – 0.674
Standard errors clustered at the District level in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
of the Arellano & Bond (1991) dynamic GMM estimator, referred to here as the First
Differenced Instrumental Variables (FDIV) estimator, in order to address the presence of ci
while not constraining λ = 1.17
Comparing columns (1) through (4) of Table 4 shows that each estimator leads to the
general conclusion that the post-CSR cohorts have lower estimated value-added than the pre-
CSR cohorts. For instance, comparing the estimated difference between the 2002-2003 and
2006-2007 cohorts, all estimators suggest similar magnitudes of this effect with the largest
being in column (3).
Given the ever-present concerns over the role unobserved student ability may play in
estimating education production functions, it may be surprising that the methods used
to address unobserved heterogeneity (FE and FDIV) yield similar results to those that
do not. As was alluded to before, the unobserved heterogeneity threatens the consistency
17Note that the sample size is decreased substantially for the FDIV estimator as the requirement of a twice
lagged score leaves only students with three consecutive test scores in the estimation sample.
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of the estimates if schools were using some static unobserved characteristic of students to
determine whether a student would be taught by a teacher hired in a particular year. It
seems reasonable, particularly when controlling for teacher experience, that schools were not
engaging in this sort of non-random assignment. While it may certainly be the case that
student achievement is affected by a student’s innate ability and that this ability is used by
schools in making some decisions, it does not appear to be used in a way that would lead
to inconsistencies in our main estimates. Importantly, the estimators that explicitly control
for ci require additional assumptions that may not be tenable in practice and tend to reduce
identifying variation (See Appendix B).
For our second sensitivity check, we replace the separate school (δs), grade (φg), and
year (ζt) effects with a single school-by-grade-by-year fixed effect. As a thought experiment,
the baseline estimates identify each cohort effect using within school comparisons of student
performance in classes taught by teachers hired in different years while flexibly controlling for
state-wide time trends and time constant differences across grades in average achievement.
This leaves the potential for other factors particular to a school in a given year (change
in leadership) or grade (pedagogical approach) to affect our baseline estimates. Again, to
generate problems, such factors must be related to the student-teacher assignment decision in
such a way to induce a correlation between the cohort indicators and the unobserved factors
even after controlling for the other covariates. In contrast, the estimates when including the
school-by-grade-by-year fixed effects effectively control for any unobserved factors particular
to a given school-grade-year that may affect student achievement. This added flexibility
comes at the cost of relying on within school-grade-year comparisons in order to identify the
cohort effects. That is, school-grade-year observations only contribute to the estimation of a
particular cohort effect if there is at least one teacher from that cohort and one from another
cohort teaching in that school-grade-year. Our baseline estimates, on the other hand, will
compare all teachers hired in different cohorts in the same school ensuring that more classes
are contributing to the estimation.18
Column (5) displays the cohort effect estimates when including school-by-grade-by-year
fixed effects. Columns (1) and (5) show very similar pre-CSR cohort effects, while the
absolute value of the post-CSR effects are slightly smaller in magnitude. Once more, however,
this slight change does not alter the conclusion that post-CSR cohorts tend to have lower
value-added than pre-CSR cohorts.19 Motivated by these results and the prior literature
18Omitting the school fixed effects entirely and including school characteristics identifies the cohort effects
by comparing teachers across schools as well. While this may increase the number of comparisons that
contribute to identification, such an approach is the most susceptible to omitted variables bias as outlined
above and in section 6. Here, this approach leads to a similar conclusion that students in post-CSR cohort
classes perform worse.
19The results are also invariant to the many potential combinations of year, grade, school, school-year,
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discussed above, throughout the remainder of the paper we will estimate variants of (6.1) by
OLS controlling for separate grade, year, and school effects.
9 Teacher Attrition and Cohort-by-Year Effects
The estimates discussed above will combine the initial average performance level for a cohort
with the longer-term impact of that cohort as the composition changes. With non-random
attrition, having a single cohort indicator for the 2001-2002 cohort will disproportionately
weight the estimates toward the relatively productive (or unproductive) teachers that con-
tribute more observations to the estimation by staying in the data longer. Conversely, the
estimated 2007-2008 cohort effect roughly weights each teacher evenly, regardless of their
eventual attachment, giving an estimate of the initial performance.
To address whether the CSR induced demand increase led to both the hiring and retention
of lower value-added teachers, as well as the possibility that attrition from teaching led to
different long-term cohort effects, the cohort-specific indicators in (6.1) are replaced with
cohort-by-year indicators:
Aigst =ζt + λAigst−1 +Xigstβ + Cohort× Y earigstγ1 + γ2A−igst−1+ (9.1)
f(Expigst) + γ3CSigst + φg + ci + δs + eigst
Table 5 displays the estimates of equation (9.1). The baseline results from column (1) of
Table 4 are also presented for reference. While the initial productivity of the earlier cohorts
is lower than the previous estimates would suggest, the relative performance of cohorts in
their first years are essentially unchanged from the previous estimates with post-CSR cohorts
having average achievement 0.0033 (p-value=0.525) to 0.0277 (p-value=0.001) standard de-
viations below the pre-CSR cohorts.20 The point estimates suggest the relative performance
gap between pre-CSR and post-CSR cohorts drops to between 0.0078 (p-value=0.280) and
0.0192 (p-value=0.004) standard deviations in each cohort’s second year. Importantly some,
but not all, second year cohort effects are statistically different at conventional levels.21
Also note that pre-CSR cohorts become comparable to the baseline teachers after three
or four years with year-specific cohort effects statistically indistinguishable from zero. The
two post-CSR cohorts observed for at least four years, 2003-2004 and 2004-2005, also appear
school-grade, and grade-year effects that could be included in the model.
20First year cohort differences that are not statistically significant at the 5% level include 2001-2002 to 2003-
2004 (p-value=0.310), 2002-2003 to 2003-2004 (p-value=0.525), and 2002-2003 to 2007-2008 (p-value=0.079)
21Second year cohort differences that are not statistically significant at the 5% level include 2001-
2002 to 2003-2004 (p-value=0.057), 2001-2002 to 2004-2005 (p-value=0.280), 2001-2002 to 2005-2006 (p-
value=0.063), 2001-2002 to 2006-2007 (p-value=0.196), and 2002-2003 to 2004-2005 (p-value=0.054)
21
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to level off to be roughly comparable to the baseline after four years. This result suggests
that the potential long-run CSR hiring effects may be even smaller than those initially
observed. However, the largest post-CSR hiring cohorts are not observed long enough to
make a complete comparison across all cohorts. In particular, the estimated third-year
effect for the 2005-2006 cohort is still statistically different from zero, at nearly one-fiftieth
of a standard deviation. It is important to note here that these estimates come from a
specification that includes a cubic term in teacher experience. This implies that much of this
observed improvement for cohorts is being driven by compositional changes of the cohort,
rather than human capital accumulation that is common to all cohorts.
These results suggest that not only may schools be initially hiring lower value-added
teachers due to the CSR-induced demand increase, but the schools may be retaining more
low value-added teachers longer in order to meet CSR requirements. State X is notable for
dismissing teachers within their first three years for poor performance at a much higher rate
than the nation as a whole, with the state’s ninety-seven day probationary rule cited as a
possible explanation. However, these results suggest that the short run CSR demand increase
may have weakened this mechanism for ensuring quality instruction. Both phenomenon, the
hiring and retention of lower value-added teachers, fit nicely within the framework of a simple
search model of teacher hiring in which teachers are effectively viewed as experience goods
(see Rockoff & Staiger 2010). However, it appears that the long-run achievement effect of
these changes may be relatively small.
A comparison across cohorts within the same year lends some insight into the role other
inputs into the education process may have had in affecting student performance over this
time. In particular, the effect of unmeasured changes in classroom inputs directly comple-
mentary to teaching may be included in the cohort effect estimates. Recall that there is some
anecdotal evidence that State X’s CSR program was not fully funded, raising the possibil-
ity that a reallocation of other inputs may have coincided with the hiring increase studied
here. However, since all teachers likely face similar resources within schools in a given year,
the fact that the earlier cohorts perform noticeably better in each year suggests that it is
not changes in these other complementary inputs driving the results. For instance, in the
2004-2005 school year the 2002-2003 cohort has an estimated cohort effect over one-twentieth
(0.0688-0.0120=0.0568; p-value=0.000) of a standard deviation better than the 2004-2005
cohort. This is a practically and statistically significant difference in performance that is
likely not due exclusively to differences in other classroom-level inputs.22
22The above estimates identify changes in mean cohort performance. Appendix C presents results for
individual teacher value-added that provide a similar conclusion
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10 Implications for Prior Quasi-experimental CSR Ef-
fect Estimates
The estimates of equations (6.1) and (9.1) can be thought of as identifying the state-wide
general equilibrium relationship between hiring cohorts and student performance. However,
it is possible that the CSR policy had more bite in schools farther away from the new class-
size maximums. In fact, the hypothesis that changes in teacher quality can explain CSR
performance is based on this notion. To be consistent with the teacher quality hypothesis,
we would need to see teacher quality fall more for those districts and schools which were
considered treated in the prior CSR effect estimates based on pre-policy class-sizes. Table
6 shows the estimates from specifications in which the entry cohorts are further divided
based on the amount of CSR pressure the school was under. This grouping is done based
on both the district averages prior to CSR and the school averages prior to the change to
school-level enforcement. Those schools already below the maximums are included in the
None group while the remaining schools are divided into quartiles based on average class size.
Starting with the district groupings, the estimates show that across the board all schools saw
a decline in the performance of new teachers over the implementation of CSR. Importantly,
it is not the case that the estimated effects are monotonically increasing in magnitude with
increases in CSR pressure. Taken together, it appears that CSR-induced hiring did not just
impact the quality of new teachers for schools originally above the new class-size maximums.
Rather it suggests that the untreated schools were still forced to move along the effective
teacher supply curve as candidates they may have otherwise hired to fill openings created
by turnover and enrolment growth were hired by nearby schools facing CSR pressure.
Similarly, the results for the school-level disaggregation do not consistently tell a story
that CSR lowered incoming teacher quality disproportionately for treated schools. One
exception, however, is in the year before school-level enforcement for those schools farthest
from reaching the new maximums (Q4). These schools, which were likely pre-empting the
switch to school-level enforcement in the following year, had a hiring cohort estimated to
be 0.0617 test score standard deviations worse than the baseline teachers, while the other
schools saw cohorts between 0.0219 and 0.0326 standard deviations worse. These results by
CSR pressure cast doubt on the teacher quality hypothesis.23
The comparison among the estimated cohort effects does not fully capture the contri-
bution of these teachers to average state-wide achievement. In particular, this comparison
23Using a similar approach, disaggregating the entry cohorts by quartiles of school-level mean student
characteristics (free or reduced lunch status, Black, or Hispanic) yields similarly mixed results with no clear
evidence that schools serving more disadvantaged students saw disproportionately worse hiring cohorts.
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Table 6: Estimates of New Cohort Effects by CSR Intensity
CSR Intensity None Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
Entry Cohort District Enforcement
2001-2002 -0.0050 -0.0039 0.0004 -0.0165* 0.0053***
(0.0076) (0.0050) (0.0091) (0.0097) (0.0012)
2002-2003 -0.0151*** 0.0038 -0.0014 -0.0188*** -0.0197***
(0.0055) (0.0078) (0.0053) (0.0042) (0.0029)
2003-2004 -0.0251*** -0.0199 -0.0164*** -0.0171* -0.0044**
(0.0062) (0.0121) (0.0045) (0.0087) (0.0019)
2004-2005 -0.0227*** -0.0292*** -0.0167*** -0.0375*** -0.0059***
(0.0052) (0.0061) (0.0065) (0.0102) (0.0016)
2005-2006 -0.0320*** -0.0240*** -0.0338*** -0.0276*** -0.0336***
(0.0050) (0.0073) (0.0067) (0.0040) (0.0028)
2006-2007 -0.0388*** -0.0176** -0.0222*** -0.0668*** -0.0229***
(0.0069) (0.0082) (0.0078) (0.0078) (0.0042)
2007-2008 -0.0357*** -0.0391*** -0.0251*** -0.0163 -0.0078***
(0.0084) (0.0060) (0.0069) (0.0129) (0.0024)
Observations 2,752,060
R-Squared 0.0653
Entry Cohort School Enforcement
2001-2002 -0.0088* -0.0117 -0.0159 0.0055 0.0488***
(0.0045) (0.0182) (0.0101) (0.0115) (0.0056)
2002-2003 -0.0074** -0.0197* -0.0201* -0.0073 -0.0126
(0.0034) (0.0113) (0.0113) (0.0147) (0.0078)
2003-2004 -0.0226*** -0.0147 -0.0052 0.0042 0.0163*
(0.0043) (0.0104) (0.0117) (0.0162) (0.0088)
2004-2005 -0.0225*** -0.0097 -0.0378* -0.0178 -0.0206*
(0.0045) (0.0114) (0.0223) (0.0132) (0.0118)
2005-2006 -0.0278*** -0.0326** -0.0263** -0.0219** -0.0617***
(0.0036) (0.0135) (0.0117) (0.0085) (0.0039)
2006-2007 -0.0306*** -0.0329** -0.0504*** -0.0195* -0.0376***
(0.0051) (0.0066) (0.0113) (0.0100) (0.0080)
2007-2008 -0.0308*** -0.0314* -0.0204 0.0040 -0.0160**
(0.0049) (0.0182) (0.0164) (0.0146) (0.0077)
Observations 2,752,060
R-Squared 0.0653
Standard errors clustered at the District level in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 7: Estimated Contribution of Cohort Composition and Experience to Average Achievement
Achievement Contribution Change from 2001-2002
Year COHORTtγ̂1 f̂(EXPt) Total COHORTtγ̂1 f̂(EXPt) Total
2001-2002 -0.0068*** 0.0272*** 0.0204*** - - -
(0.0010) (0.0030) (0.0029) - - -
2002-2003 -0.0074*** 0.0270*** 0.0195*** -0.0006 0.0002*** -0.0009**
(0.0010) (0.0030) (0.0030) (0.0004) (0.0000) (0.0004)
2003-2004 -0.0090*** 0.0275*** 0.0185*** -0.0022*** -0.0002*** -0.0019***
(0.0015) (0.0031) (0.0029) (0.0008) (0.0001) (0.0007)
2004-2005 -0.0115*** 0.0271*** 0.0156*** -0.0047*** -0.0001*** -0.0048***
(0.0020) (0.0030) (0.0027) (0.0012) (0.0000) (0.0012)
2005-2006 -0.0149*** 0.0267*** 0.0118*** -0.0081*** -0.0005*** -0.0086***
(0.0017) (0.0030) (0.0028) (0.0010) (0.0001) (0.0010)
2006-2007 -0.0182*** 0.0261*** 0.0079*** -0.0114*** -0.0011*** -0.0125***
(0.0021) (0.0029) (0.0028) (0.0013) (0.0002) (0.0013)
2007-2008 -0.0233*** 0.0265*** 0.0032 -0.0165*** -0.0007*** -0.0172***
(0.0028) (0.0030) (0.0032) (0.0020) (0.0002) (0.0019)
Standard errors clustered at the District level in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
misses the fact that not all students in CSR years are taught by teachers hired in post-CSR
cohorts and that the average experience in the state dropped in post-CSR years. To assess
the effect on average achievement of the change in average quality of new cohorts and the
drop in average experience, the contribution of each of these components is calculated us-
ing the estimates of equation (6.1). The estimated contribution to average achievement in
the state of the cohort composition and teacher experience are calculated in each year as
COHORT tγˆ1 and fˆ(EXPt) = EXPtβˆ1 + EXP 2t βˆ2 + EXP
3
t βˆ3, respectively.
Both the total contribution and the separate contribution of each component are pre-
sented in Table 7, along with the change since 2001. While the contribution attributable to
these components falls over the introduction of CSR, even in the worst year this represents
only a difference of 0.0172 standard deviations. This difference is driven more by the relative
performance of the cohorts than by the drop in teacher experience.24
To directly assess the role of these same changes in explaining the lack of estimated CSR
achievement gains, estimates are used from a modified version of (6.1) in which a CSR treat-
ment dummy is interacted with all included regressors. Table 8 displays the evolution of the
total contribution (cohort composition plus experience) of teachers to average performance
separately for schools considered “treated” and “untreated” based on the districts pre-CSR
class-sizes. Table 8 also shows the difference in these changes between treated and untreated
schools. Column six is of particular interest as it relates to the type of comparison previously
used to estimate CSR policy effects. Specifically, prior CSR effect studies rely on treatment-
control comparisons (Difference-in-difference (DinD), Comparative Interrupted Time Series,
24Recall that the experience profile can be thought to capture the effects of differential attrition and within
school sorting of students to more experienced teachers, in addition to human capital accumulation.
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Table 8: Estimated Total Contribution to Average Achievement: Treatment vs. Control Schools
Total Achievement Contribution Change from 2001-2002
Year Treatment Control Difference Treatment Control Difference
2001-2002 0.0204*** 0.0214*** -0.0010 - - -
(0.0034) (0.0057) (0.0066) - - -
2002-2003 0.0195*** 0.0204*** -0.0009 -0.0008 -0.0010 0.0001
(0.0033) (0.0061) (0.0069) (0.0005) (0.0008) (0.0010)
2003-2004 0.0193*** 0.0169** 0.0024 -0.0010 -0.0045*** 0.0035**
(0.0031) (0.0065) (0.0072) (0.0009) (0.0010) (0.0013)
2004-2005 0.0161*** 0.0150** 0.0011 -0.0043*** -0.0064*** -0.0021
(0.0031) (0.0060) (0.0067) (0.0015) (0.0017) (0.0023)
2005-2006 0.0133*** 0.0082 0.0051 -0.0071*** -0.0132*** 0.0061***
(0.0033) (0.0058) (0.0066) (0.0012) (0.0011) (0.0016)
2006-2007 0.0097*** 0.0035 0.0062 -0.0107*** -0.0179*** 0.0072***
(0.0030) (0.0064) (0.0071) (0.0015) (0.0014) (0.0021)
2007-2008 0.0084*** 0.0018 0.0066 -0.0120*** -0.0196*** 0.0076***
(0.0031) (0.0076) (0.0082) (0.0017) (0.0022) (0.0028)
Standard errors clustered at the District level in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
or other related estimators) to estimate CSR effects. Loosely speaking, instead of examining
the DinD of student achievement as in the prior work, here we consider the DinD of the
portion of student achievement attributable to teachers. Both treated and untreated schools
experience a drop in the teachers’ contribution to average achievement. Interestingly, the
CSR schools saw a slightly smaller drop, 0.0076 test score standard deviations smaller by
2007-2008, than those schools for which CSR was not binding at introduction. This esti-
mate is of the opposite sign needed to explain the finding of no achievement gain from CSR.
Clearly, the change in average achievement attributable to the make-up of the teaching stock
falls well short of explaining the lack of achievement gains.
11 Conclusion
The results presented above provide little support for the conclusion that a drop in the quality
of newly hired teachers explains the lack of noticeable achievement gains from CSR in State
X. Despite large increases in the number of teachers, the evidence suggests that newly-
hired teachers account for only slight decreases in achievement during the implementation
of CSR. The overall drop in achievement from the 2001-2002 to the 2007-2008 school year
attributable to changes in the average quality, experience, and cohort composition of fourth
through sixth grade teachers is estimated to be only 0.0172 test score standard deviations.
Furthermore, the results suggest that this decrease in quality was experienced by both treated
and untreated schools alike. These treatment spillovers imply that the disappointing CSR
effects found in quasi-experimental research cannot be explained by differential changes in
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new teacher quality.
Given that entering teacher quality does not play a large role in the failure of State X’s
CSR program to achieve expected gains, exploring alternative mechanisms is an important
next step. One possibility is that other input levels may have changed, especially in cases
in which CSR was implemented without full funding, as was the case in State X. As noted
above, however, differences in resources directly used by teachers after CSR may also have
a limited scope for explaining CSR performance. Finally, in this paper we focus on the
inflow of teachers into the state public elementary school system that accompanied CSR.
An important next step is to consider how these changes in demand may have led to a
movement of teachers across schools. Understanding the mechanisms at play will help to
determine whether popular CSR policies can be designed to promote achievement gains.
More generally, the results of this paper suggest that while large short-run increases in
teacher demand may lead to modest declines in the value-added of newly hired teachers,
these declines may not substantially affect long-run achievement. This conclusion should
be interpreted with caution, as our findings reflect the experience of a single state based
on teachers in grades four through six. In other states or grades, the quality of incoming
teachers may fall more dramatically in response to the introduction of CSR policies.
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Appendix
A Additional Tables
Appendix Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Test Score 1625.46 246.90 District CSR
Asian 0.02 0.14 G4-G8 Average Class-size 24.27 2.86
Black 0.23 0.42 Below Max 0.26 0.44
Hispanic 0.23 0.42 Q1 0.20 0.40
Other Race 0.03 0.18 Q2 0.23 0.42
Female 0.50 0.50 Q3 0.17 0.37
Disabled 0.12 0.33 Q4 0.14 0.35
Free or Reduced Lunch 0.50 0.50 School CSR
Limited English 0.04 0.20 G4-G8 AverageClass-size 20.83 3.15
Age 10.67 1.00 Below Max 0.71 0.45
Foreign Born 0.09 0.28 Q1 0.07 0.26
Days Present 166.75 21.04 Q2 0.07 0.26
Days Absent 7.72 7.70 Q3 0.07 0.26
Lagged Peer Score 1515.01 169.72 Q4 0.07 0.26
Class-size G4 20.86 8.70 Entry Cohorts
Class-size G5 22.49 11.07 2001-2002 0.10 0.30
Class-size G6 82.46 35.32 2002-2003 0.09 0.29
Teacher Experience 10.77 10.35 2003-2004 0.10 0.30
2004-2005 0.11 0.31
2005-2006 0.10 0.30
2006-2007 0.09 0.29
2007-2008 0.07 0.25
Source: State X Administrative Data
Appendix Table 2: Estimates from Pooled OLS Regressions
Specification Cohort Cohort-by-Year
Equation (6.1) (9.1)
Prior Math Score 0.706*** 0.706***
(0.00564) (0.00564)
Asian 0.0947*** 0.0947***
(0.00515) (0.00511)
Black -0.137*** -0.137***
(0.00347) (0.00347)
Hispanic -0.0273*** -0.0273***
(0.00242) (0.00244)
Other Race -0.0239*** -0.0240***
(0.00229) (0.00231)
Female -0.0160*** -0.0160***
(0.00148) (0.00148)
Disabled -0.185*** -0.185***
(0.0124) (0.0125)
Free or Reduced Lunch -0.0585*** -0.0584***
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(0.00141) (0.00140)
Limited English -0.0738*** -0.0742***
(0.01000) (0.0100)
Age -0.0555*** -0.0554***
(0.00322) (0.00322)
Foreign Born 0.0706*** 0.0706***
(0.00354) (0.00356)
Days Present 0.00109*** 0.00108***
(3.58e-05) (3.56e-05)
Days Absent -0.00500*** -0.00500***
(0.000293) (0.000293)
Experience 0.00731*** 0.00502***
(0.000890) (0.000699)
Experience Sq -0.000341*** -0.000231***
(4.72e-05) (3.40e-05)
Experience Cu 4.23e-06*** 2.76e-06***
(6.92e-07) (4.39e-07)
Lagged Peer Score 0.0799*** 0.0789***
(0.0131) (0.0131)
Class Size 8.97e-05 5.00e-06
(0.000252) (0.000258)
Class Size*G5 -7.95e-05 -2.58e-05
(0.000412) (0.000429)
Class Size*G6 -0.000535 -0.000540*
(0.000328) (0.000320)
Observations 2,752,060 2,752,060
R-squared 0.653 0.653
Robust standard errors in parentheses:
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
B Measuring Teacher Quality
The purpose of value-added models (VAMs) is to separate the portion of student growth
attributable to particular teachers from the many other possible sources of growth. Viewed
in this light, the challenges of VAM estimation are those faced in identifying causal rela-
tionships with panel data more generally. VAM estimation has proven to be difficult in
non-experimental settings and there is no consensus on what the best model of student
achievement is or the best approach to estimating the portion attributable to teachers (Mc-
Caffrey et al. 2004; Kane & Staiger 2008, Rothstein 2009, 2010; Koedel & Betts 2011).
Much of this difficulty stems from the non-random assignment of students to teachers both
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within and across schools.
The following discussion draws heavily from prior work on the assumptions applied to the
education production function underlying VAM estimation (Todd & Wolpin 2003; Harris,
Sass, & Semykina 2011; Guarino, Reckase, & Wooldridge 2011). This discussion should
be thought of as a guide for considering the issues that arise in VAM estimation, rather
than outlining a more formal structural model of education production to be estimated.
The starting point for the value-added framework is a very general model that specifies a
student’s achievement in a particular year as a function of both current and past inputs to
the education process and the student’s unobserved ability:
Ait =ft(Xit, . . . , Xi0, Eit, . . . , Ei0, ci, uit) (B.1)
where
Ait is the achievement of student i in year t
Xit is a vector of family and student characteristics for student i in year t
Eit is a vector of education inputs for student i in year t
ci is unobserved student ability
uit is an idiosyncratic shock to student i’s achievement in year t
Here, the vector Eit can be thought to include indicators for individual teachers or groups of
teachers. Given computational and data constraints, several assumptions are typically made
to yield a tractable estimating equation. First it is assumed that ft is linear and constant
across years:
Ait = αt +Xitβ0+, . . . ,+Xi0βt + Eitγ0 + . . .+ Ei0γt + ηtci + uit (B.2)
Typically, researchers do not have complete data on all prior inputs. To address the lack
of prior inputs, it is common to add and subtract λAit−1 to the right hand side of (B.2).
Assuming that the effect of the inputs decays at a geometric rate equal to λ and that ηt−ληt−1
is a constant (set to equal one without loss of generality) allows us to eliminate the lagged
inputs and rewrite equation (B.2) as a function of current inputs and lagged achievement
only:
Ait = ζt + λAit−1 +Xitβ0 + Eitγ0 + ci + eit (B.3)
eit = uit − λuit−1
Up to now, the assumptions made on the original model in equation (B.1) have been pri-
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marily data-driven. At this point, there is some choice over further assumptions imposed
on the model. Under the assumptions that eit is serially uncorrelated and that ci is uncor-
related with the included inputs (or equal to zero),25 equation (B.3), referred to as the lag
score equation from here on, could be reasonably estimated by OLS.26 While the no-serial-
correlation assumption is by no means trivial, the assumption that ci is uncorrelated with
the inputs is perhaps the most questionable. It seems possible, given non-random sorting of
students and teachers into schools, as well as non-random assignment of students to teachers
within schools, that the student unobserved ability may be correlated with teacher assign-
ment. Despite these concerns, there is evidence that this approach may be preferred and so
it will serve as the basis for the main analysis in this paper.
As a sensitivity check, we also consider other value-added models and estimators. Briefly,
it is also common to assume that λ = 1, and to subtract Ait−1 from both sides of equation
(B.3), yielding a gain score model of student achievement:
∆Ait = ζt +Xitβ0 + Eitγ0 + ci + νit (B.4)
νit = uit − uit−1
Equation (B.4) could then be estimated by OLS or fixed effects (FE).27 OLS estimation
of (B.4) relaxes the need for no serial correlation in the errors at the cost of assuming the
prior achievement persists completely in determining current achievement. If λ 6= 1, then
this approach effectively introduces an additional term, (λ − 1)Ait−1, on the right hand
side of equation (B.4), which may lead to an omitted variables bias (Dieterle et al. 2012).
Importantly, OLS on (B.4) does not control for the unobserved student heterogeneity in any
way.
FE estimation is particularly appealing, as it relaxes the assumption that ci is uncorre-
lated with the inputs. However, FE requires the additional assumption that Xit and Eit are
strictly exogenous conditional on ci in (B.4) for consistent estimation. The strict exogeneity
assumption essentially implies that the inputs in time t are uncorrelated with the unobserved
error terms in every time period.28 Practically speaking, the strict exogeneity assumption
25This condition would hold if λ ≈ 1 and ηt ≈ ηt−1
26Note that prior achievement is also a function of the unobserved student heterogeneity term, and is
therefore endogenous in (7.3) when ci is not zero and ignored. This certainly leads to inconsistent estimates
of λ, but the extent to which this bias is propagated in the estimated teacher effects is unclear.
27In the panel data context, the gain score equation is also commonly estimated using an Empirical Bayes
shrinkage estimator (Kane & Staiger, 2008). Note that the shrinkage factor is determined by the number
of observations per group and tends toward one as the group size becomes large. Since in our preferred
specification the groups size is quite large and is similar across all groups, the Empirical Bayes estimator
will yield results very similar to OLS.
28Note that the strict exogeneity assumption is what precludes the use of fixed effects on the lag score
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precludes any feedback from realized achievement shocks to future inputs. For instance, if
a principal reacts to a randomly good or bad test score in one year when determining a fu-
ture teacher assignment, this would violate strict exogeneity. As noted by Rothstein (2009,
2010), the fixed effects approach is useful when assignment to teachers is made based on a
static characteristic of the student. The usefulness of FE estimation breaks down some when
assignment decisions are made dynamically based on new information gathered over time by
the relevant decision makers, be it principals, parents, or the students.
Finally, it has become more common to estimate teacher value-added using approaches
based on the dynamic GMM estimator found in Arellano & Bond (1991) (see Koedel &
Betts 2011). Researchers taking this approach either use the Arellano & Bond GMM es-
timator, or a 2SLS version based on identical moment conditions, here referred to as the
First-Differenced Instrumental Variables (FDIV) estimator.29 Specifically, a first-differenced
version of the lag score equation (B.3) is estimated using twice-lagged test scores as an in-
strument for the lagged gain score. This estimator directly addresses the presence of ci in
(B.3) through the first-differencing while also avoiding the problem that including lagged
achievement violates strict exogeneity with the use of instrumental variables. Importantly,
this approach still requires strict exogeneity of the other regressors. While this assumption
could be relaxed by using lagged regressors as instruments, as is done for prior achievement,
this has not been common in the value-added literature. Most importantly, the Arellano &
Bond-inspired approach requires that the errors in (B.3) not be serially correlated for twice
lagged achievement to be a valid instrument. Finally, these approaches require an additional
year of data for each student, thereby reducing the sample with which teacher value-added
can be calculated.
C Individual Teacher Value-added
The main estimates found in the paper identify changes in mean cohort performance. To
allow for a comparison of the entire distribution of teacher quality over time, individual
teacher value-added is also estimated by replacing the cohort indicators in (6.1) with in-
dicators for each teacher.30 Teachers are given a percentile rank based on their estimated
value-added relative to all the teachers in the sample. Figure 3 displays histograms of the
distribution of teacher percentile ranks for each entry cohort. The solid line on each graph
equation as well. The lag score equation necessarily violates strict exogeneity by including the lagged
dependent variable as a regressor since Ait−1 must be correlated with the error term in period t-1.
29The GMM and FDIV approaches are identical if the optimal GMM weighting matrix is replaced by an
identity matrix.
30Due to computational constraints, this estimation is done separately by district.
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represents a uniform distribution of percentile ranks (i.e., the distribution for a cohort if
a given teacher from that cohort was equally likely to be ranked anywhere in the overall
distribution). Prior to CSR, the percentile rank distribution of the entry cohorts is roughly
uniform. Over the implementation of CSR, starting with the 2003-2004 entry cohort, there
is a noticeable increase in the probability a given teacher will be ranked below the twentieth
percentile.
It is important to note that the value-added estimates for later cohorts will tend to
be noisier. However, if differences in the percentile rank distributions across cohorts were
simply an artifact of increased noise, more outliers would be expected at both ends of the
distribution resulting in a U-shaped distribution. That we only see more teachers at the low
end of the percentile rank distribution for the later cohorts suggest that it is not due purely
to noise. Regardless, Figure 3 provides additional suggestive evidence that teachers hired
post-CSR were more likely to be low value-added teachers.
37
0.005
.01
.015
0 20 40 60 80 100
Percentile Rank
2001-2002 Entry Cohort
0
.005
.01
.015
0 20 40 60 80 100
Percentile Rank
2002-2003 Entry Cohort
0
.005
.01
.015
0 20 40 60 80 100
Percentile Rank
2003-2004 Entry Cohort
0
.005
.01
.015
0 20 40 60 80 100
Percentile Rank
2004-2005 Entry Cohort
0
.005
.01
.015
0 20 40 60 80 100
Percentile Rank
2005-2006 Entry Cohort
0
.005
.01
.015
0 20 40 60 80 100
Percentile Rank
2006-2007 Entry Cohort
0
.005
.01
.015
0 20 40 60 80 100
Percentile Rank
2007-2008 Entry Cohort
Figure 3: Percentile Rank Distributions
38
